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JUDGING THE NEXT EMERGENCY:
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS IN TIMES OF CRISIS
David Cole*
INTRODUCTION
As virtually every law student who studies Marbury v. Madison'
learns, Chief Justice John Marshall's tactical genius was to establish
judicial review in a case where the result could not be challenged. As a
technical matter, Marbury lost, and the executive branch won. As
furious as President Jefferson reportedly was with the decision, there
was nothing he could do about it, for there was no mandate to defy.
The Court's decision offered no remedy for Marbury himself, whose
rights were directly at issue, and whose rights the Court found had
indeed been violated. But over time, it became clear that the decision
was a landmark victory for those who consider judicial review of
political-branch action a critical element of a constitutional system.
Judicial review on matters of national security frequently follows
the Marbury model. It rarely provides relief to the individuals before
the Court when the national-security crisis is at its height. As in
Marbury itself, the challengers generally lose, and the government
generally wins. As a result, the conventional wisdom is that courts
function poorly as guardians of liberty in times of crisis. Schenck,2
Korematsu,3 and Dennis,4 from World War I, World War II, and the
Cold War, respectively, are a few of the more notorious examples. In
those cases, the Court authorized the criminalization of speech during
World War I, detention based on race during World War II, and guilt
by association during the Cold War.
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1980, J.D. 1984, Yale University.
- Ed. In my capacity as a volunteer staff attorney for the Center for Constitutional Rights, I
was co-counsel in some of the cases discussed herein, including North Jersey Media Group,
Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), Haddad v. Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D.
Mich. 2002), and Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 02-55082, 2003 U.S.
App. LEXIS 24305 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003). My colleague Mark Tushnet provided invaluable
feedback, despite his evident disagreement with my position.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
2. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
3. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
4. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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The traditional view, based on these and other examples, holds
that judicial review has largely failed to protect individual rights when
their protection is most needed. There are good reasons to suspect
that this would be so, and, as the examples cited above illustrate, there
is plenty of evidence to support the conventional wisdom. But the
conventional wisdom is too pessimistic. It is akin to arguing that
Marbury demonstrates the weakness of the judiciary because the
Court failed to afford Marbury himself relief for the violation of his
rights.
Considered over time, judicial review of emergency and national-
security measures can and has established important constraints on the
exercise of emergency powers and has restricted the scope of what is
acceptable in future emergencies. Because emergency measures
frequently last well beyond the de facto end of the emergency, and
because the wheels of justice move slowly, courts often have an oppor-
tunity to assess the validity of emergency measures after the emer-
gency has passed, when passions have been reduced and reasoned
judgment is more attainable. In doing so, courts have at least some-
times been able to take advantage of hindsight to pronounce certain
emergency measures invalid for infringing constitutional rights. And
because courts, unlike the political branches or the political culture
more generally, must explain their reasons in a formal manner that
then has precedential authority in future disputes, judicial decisions
offer an opportunity to set the terms of the next crisis, even if they
often come too late to be of much assistance in the immediate term.
Thus, the Court has over time developed a highly protective test for
speech advocating illegal activity,' subjected all racial discrimination
since Korematsu to exacting scrutiny,6 and prohibited guilt by associa-
tion.7 These decisions, among others, impose important limits on what
the government can do in the current, post-September 11th crisis.
Since Marbury, scholars have devoted thousands of pages to
debating the issue of judicial review, offering critiques of Chief Justice
Marshall's reasoning, proposing alternative defenses of judicial review,
and, more recently, questioning the value of judicial review altogether.
One of the most familiar, and in my view still the strongest, defenses
of judicial review is that first advanced in footnote four of Carolene
Products,' implemented by the Warren Court and given its definitive
academic elaboration in Professor John Hart Ely's Democracy and
Distrust.9 This is the notion that as an institution insulated from
5. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
6. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
7. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982).
8. Carolene Prods. v. United States, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1944).
9. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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everyday politics, the Court is best suited to protect the interests of
those who cannot protect themselves through the political process,
whether they be members of discrete and insular minorities, dissi-
dents, noncitizens, or other vulnerable individuals. As others have
shown, the Court does not always live up to its responsibility.'1 But it is
nonetheless an important ideal to which courts should be held
accountable.
How should we judge judicial review from the standpoint of pro-
tecting the constitutional rights and liberties of the vulnerable in times
of crisis? It is in times of crisis that constitutional rights and liberties
are most needed, because the temptation to sacrifice them in the name
of national security will be at its most acute. To government officials,
civil rights and liberties often appear to be mere obstacles to effective
protection of the national interest. As Bush-administration supporters
frequently intone when defending their post-September 11th initia-
tives, "the Constitution is not a suicide pact."'1 Judicial protection is
also critical because crisis measures are typically targeted at the most
vulnerable among us, especially noncitizens, who have little or no
voice in the political process. 2 We have been in such a crisis period
since September 11th and will be for the foreseeable future. So now is
a particularly propitious time to assess the value of judicial review in
times of crisis.13
Part I of this Article will set forth the traditional view that the judi-
ciary is inadequate in times of crisis, along with the evidence that
supports it and the reasons that might explain it. Part II maintains that
the traditional view overstates the case, because over time judicial de-
cisions have had more of a constraining influence on emergency
measures than appears when one looks only at the courts'
performance in the midst of a crisis. Part III surveys judicial
performance since September 11th on matters of national security and
argues that while the record is far from exemplary, courts have actu-
ally been more willing to stand up to the government in this period
than in many prior crises. Part IV responds to a recent proposal by
10. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (1991).
11. See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Narrow, Prudent, and Impeccable, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 10,
2002. The quote comes from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).
12. I develop this point in DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003) [hereinafter COLE,
ENEMY ALIENS].
13. I will resist offering broad generalizations about judicial review. Generalizing about
judicial review from the standpoint of how courts act in national emergencies is, to me, as
invalid as judging the propriety of judicial review on the basis of the Supreme Court's
performance in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). The fact that courts, like all other institu-
tions, are susceptible to political pressure in times of high crisis does not warrant a rejection
of judicial review in general or of the ideals that animate it. I address only the somewhat
more specific question of how judicial review works in emergencies and on matters of na-
tional security.
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two leading scholars that courts and the Constitution ought to play less
of a role in assessing emergency measures. 4 Professors Oren Gross
and Mark Tushnet have both recently argued that the poor perform-
ance of courts during emergency periods and the need for extraordi-
nary emergency powers should impel us to acknowledge explicitly the
validity of extraconstitutional emergency measures and leave judg-
ment of such measures to the political rather than the judicial process.
In my view, this proposal is fundamentally misguided, both because it
fails to acknowledge the valuable role that courts have played, when
viewed over time, in constraining emergency powers, and because the
alternative of relying on the political process would almost certainly
provide even less protection for individual rights than the courts have.
To paraphrase Winston Churchill, judicial review is the worst protec-
tor of liberty in times of crisis, with the exception of all the others.
I. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
The conventional wisdom is that courts are ineffective as guardians
of liberty when the general public is clamoring for security. Clinton
Rossiter, in an influential study of the Supreme Court in wartime,
concluded that:
the courts of the United States, from the highest to the lowest, can do
nothing to restrain and next to nothing to mitigate an arbitrary presiden-
tial military program suspending the liberties of some part of the civilian
population.... Whatever relief is afforded, and however ringing the de-
fense of liberty that goes with it, will be precious little and far too late.15
Judge Learned Hand similarly concluded that one cannot rely on
the courts in times when the people do not fight for their own rights:
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon consti-
tutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes.... Liberty
lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution,
no law, nor court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even
do much to help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no
court to save it.'
6
Justice Robert Jackson took this view so far as to advocate in
dissent in Korematsu that the civil courts should simply refuse to en-
force military orders. Jackson famously wrote:
14. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules.- Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflec-
tions on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 273.
15. CLINTON RossITER & R. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 52 (expanded ed. 1976).
16. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED
HAND 89-90 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1960).
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Of course the existence of a military power resting on force, so vagrant,
so centralized, so necessarily heedless of the individual, is an inherent
threat to liberty. But I would not lead people to rely on this Court for a
review that seems to me wholly delusive.... If the people ever let com-
mand of the war power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands,
the courts wield no power equal to its restraint. The chief restraint upon
those who command the physical forces of the country, in the future as in
the past, must be their responsibility to the political judgments of their
contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history.' 7
Finally, George Bernard Shaw gave the critique his own inimitable
flair in offering the following evaluation of the courts during World
War I:
[D]uring the war the courts in France, bleeding under German guns,
were very severe; the courts in England, hearing but the echoes of those
guns, were grossly unjust; but the courts in the United States, knowing
naught save censored news of those guns, were stark, staring, raving
mad. 18
There is a wealth of evidence to support this conventional wisdom.
During the Civil War, apart from Chief Justice. Taney's ineffectual
solo intervention in Ex parte Merryman9 - in which he declared
invalid President Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus, only to have
Lincoln ignore him - the Supreme Court as a whole largely stayed
out of the war. During World War I, the Court failed to overturn a
single one of the more than one thousand convictions handed down
for speaking out against the war or the draft.2" It chose to review only
a handful of the convictions, and affirmed them all, most by a unani-
mous vote.2 In World War II, the Court upheld the Japanese
internment and unanimously affirmed the military-tribunal convic-
tions of several German saboteurs,22 with Justice Frankfurter playing a
lead role in crafting the majority decision despite having personally
played a critical advisory role in creating the tribunals in the first
place.23 In the early years of the Cold War, as well, the Court either
17. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
18. See Ex parte Starr, 263 F. 145, 147 (D. Mont. 1920). Justice Brennan has advanced
much the same evaluation. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a
Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 11, 11
(1988) ("There is... a good deal to be embarrassed about, when one reflects on the shabby
treatment civil liberties have received in the United States during times of perceived threats
to its national security.").
19. 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861) (No. 9487).
20. COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 12, at 12-13.
21. Id.
22. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
23. Melvin I. Urofsky, Inter Arma Silent Leges: Extrajudicial Activity, Patriotism and the
Rule of Law, in TOTAL WAR AND THE LAW: THE AMERICAN HOME FRONT IN WORLD
WAR II 27 (Daniel R. Ernst & Victor Jew eds., 2002).
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denied review or affirmed anti-Communist measures, thereby allowing
guilt by association to operate largely unchecked. 24
There are at least four reasons why courts are likely to fare poorly
on matters of national security, especially in times of crisis. First, their
independence notwithstanding, judges are part of the government and
are likely to identify with the government's interests when matters of
national security are at stake. The populace as a whole generally
rallies around the executive branch in times of crisis, and courts are
likely to do so as well. As history has shown, judges cannot stand
above the crisis, precisely because the threat at least presumably
implicates them as well - both as part of the government and as part
of the society.
Second, assessing claims of national security, especially during
times of crisis, is inherently difficult, and judges are likely to feel
ill-equipped to do so. Most questions of constitutional rights and liber-
ties present a question of balancing. Even the prohibition on race dis-
crimination can be overcome by a sufficiently compelling justification
and narrowly tailored means .2 But how does one accurately measure
the risk that Al Qaeda might gain critical information enabling it to
attack us, or that an individual, if set free, might endanger the national
security?
Such decisions must inevitably rest on incomplete information, and
the courts' information is often even more incomplete than that of the
executive. The executive branch frequently has a monopoly on the
information because so much of it is classified, the challengers are
often unable to respond, and, absent adversarial testing, it is difficult
for a court to know whether the government has been fully candid in
its assessment. The Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu, in which
it deferred to military claims of necessity as justification for the
Japanese internment, was later shown to be based on an inaccurate
record; the executive branch concealed from the Court critical infor-
mation about its own doubts concerning the reality of the threat posed
by the Japanese population. Indeed, the executive branch's misrepre-
sentations were so fundamental that years later courts overturned the
convictions on writs of coram nobis. 26
Third, courts must worry that if they rule against the government
on a matter of national security, they may face a potential test of their
credibility and legitimacy. If the President truly believes that the secu-
24. ARTHUR J. SABIN, IN CALMER TIMES: THE SUPREME COURT AND RED MONDAY
90-105 (1999); William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism:
The Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 SuP. CT. REV. 375, 428-34.
25. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
26. Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 604-08 (9th Cir. 1987); Korematsu v.
United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1419 (N.D. Cal. 1984). See generally PETER IRONS,
JUSTICE AT WAR (1983).
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rity of the nation is at stake, it is entirely possible that he will defy any
decision against him.27 During the Civil War, for example, when Chief
Justice Taney in Ex parte Merryman8 ruled that President Lincoln's
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was unconstitutional and
granted a writ of habeas corpus, the military refused to produce the
petitioner. Justice Taney then issued an attachment for contempt, but
the military refused to accept service of that order. President Lincoln
simply ignored Justice Taney's decision altogether.
Fourth, and perhaps most significantly, judges must worry that if
they rule against the government, their decisions might be followed, at
some subsequent cost to national security. Just as no judge wants to be
the one who has freed a defendant to commit violent crime again, so
no judge wants to issue an order that actually causes serious harm to
the national security. And since prognostications about security risks
are just that, and one can never really be certain, judges may be
inclined to err on the side of caution and the government. At the oral
argument before the Third Circuit in North Jersey Media Group v.
Ashcroft,29 a case challenging the constitutionality of the Attorney
General's decision to close to the public all immigration proceedings
involving hundreds of detainees labeled of "special interest" to the
September 11th investigation, Judge Morton Greenberg told the
ACLU lawyer arguing the case, "We could make a decision here...
and people could die. Lots of people ... I saw the second hit [during
the World Trade Center attack of September 11th], and I can't erase it
from my mind."3"
II. A REVISIONIST VIEW
While there are undoubtedly good reasons and plenty of evidence
to support the conventional wisdom that courts perform poorly on
matters of national security, that judgment ultimately rests on too
narrow a focus - namely, an assessment of how the courts have
performed in the midst of particular crises for the particular litigants
before them. When one asks instead what role judicial decisions have
played over time in framing the options available to the executive
branch in emergency periods, a less pessimistic evaluation is
warranted. The Supreme Court's decisions during the waning of
emergencies, or after the emergencies have ended, have not infre-
quently called into question or reversed its earlier rulings and have
27. See Louis SMITH, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY POWER 266 (1951).
28. 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861).
29. 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
30. Arguments Made on Deportation Hearing Regs, PA. L. WKLY, Sept. 23, 2002, at 9
(quoting Judge Greenberg).
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created precedents that impose a degree of restraint on the govern-
ment's actions during the next emergency.
After the Civil War ended and President Lincoln was buried, for
example, the Supreme Court issued Ex parte Milligan,3 in which it de-
clared that, as long as the civil courts remained open for business, the
President did not have constitutional authority to try a United States
citizen by military tribunal for allegedly conspiring with the enemy.
The Court broadly insisted that the Constitution applies equally in,
peacetime and wartime:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection
all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine,
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of
man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the
great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy
or depotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for
the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it,
which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved
by the result of the great effort to throw off its just authority. 32
At the close of World War II, the Court decided Duncan v.
Kohanamoku,33 which, like Ex parte Milligan, imposed limits on
martial law by invalidating a conviction of a civilian in a military tri-
bunal in Hawaii. The Court reasoned, as in Milligan, that trial by mili-
tary tribunal was barred as long as the civil courts were open. Notably,
however, the Court delayed issuing a decision in Kohanamoku until
more than a year after it agreed to hear the case, leading one contem-
poraneous commentator to speculate that the Court had purposefully
waited until it was clear that martial law would not have to be
reimposed in Hawaii.34
Similarly, while the Court consistently upheld the harsh suppres-
sion of antiwar speech during World War I, 5 it subsequently devel-
oped increasingly stronger versions of the "clear and present danger"
test for protecting subversive speech. In Yates v. United States,36 de-
cided two and one-half years after Senator Joseph McCarthy had been
31. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
32. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 120-21; see also Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1934) ("[The Constitution's] grants of power to the Federal
Government and its limitations of the power of the States were determined in the light of
emergency and they are not altered by emergency.., even the war power does not remove
constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties").
33. 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
34. EDWIN CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 104-05 (1947).
35. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 332-33 (1920); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 209-10 (1919); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
36. 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
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censured, the Court required the government to prove advocacy of ac-
tion, not merely advocacy of abstract doctrine. That ruling put an end
to the ongoing use of the 1940 Smith Act37 to criminalize Communist
Party leaders for their advocacy.38 Still later, in 1969, the Court
adopted an even more speech-protective test in Brandenburg v. Ohio,
holding that speech advocating illegal conduct is constitutionally pro-
tected unless it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action."39 That test
forecloses virtually any prosecution for speech advocating crime short
of an actual conspiracy to commit crime. With these rulings, the
Court's First Amendment doctrine now imposes significant limits on
the government's ability to restrict speech in times of emergency or as
a matter of national security. Thus, even though the Court did little to
help antiwar activists Schenck, Debs, Frohwerk, and Abrams during
World War 1,40 or to stand up to McCarthyism at its height, the Court
ultimately adopted an interpretation of the First Amendment that pro-
tects the rights of latter-day Schencks and Communists to speak as
they wish, so much so that outright censorship of antiwar speech is no
longer a plausible option for the government in wartime.
Supreme Court decisions have also largely barred another
common tactic of emergency government - guilt by association. In
emergencies, authorities seeking to prevent future harm often resort
to guilt by association because it permits the imposition of guilt with-
out proof that an individual has committed a specific violent act."
When the Court in Yates effectively foreclosed prosecutions of
Communists under the Smith Act's advocacy provisions, federal
prosecutors turned to that statute's "membership" provisions. But in
Scales v. United States,42 the Court interpreted the membership provi-
sions to require proof not merely of membership, but of "specific
intent" to further the organization's illegal ends.43 Driven by concerns
that guilt by association violates both the First and Fifth Amendments,
the Court ruled that individuals could not be prosecuted for mere
membership in the Communist Party, nor even for active membership
supporting its lawful ends. Instead, the Court held that the govern-
ment must prove that an individual's Party activities were specifically
37. Alien Registration Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670.
38. See SABIN, supra note 24, at 169-70 (discussing the effect of the Yates decision).
39. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
40. See supra note 35.
41. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (2003) (discussing reliance on guilt by association in pre-
ventive law enforcement).
42. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
43. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 220 (1961).
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intended to further criminal conduct - in effect, that he had con-
spired to commit or support crime. The Court subsequently extended
that principle broadly, ruling that absent proof of specific intent, the
state could not use association to deny security clearances for work in
defense facilities, passports for travel abroad, teaching positions,
admission to the bar, or even the use of campus meeting rooms by
student groups. 44 Thus, while the Court did little to block the imposi-
tion of guilt by association during the early years of the Cold War, its
later decisions stemming from that period largely prohibit that tactic
today.45
The Vietnam War era also resulted in important judicial decisions
limiting or rejecting claims of national security. The Vietnam War did
not present the same sort of direct threat to national security that was
felt during the World Wars and the Cold War. But it nonetheless
prompted substantial government incursions on liberties and also pro-
duced two landmark national-security cases, both of which resulted in
decisions against the government. In New York Times Co. v. United
States,46 the Court in 1971 permitted the publication of the Pentagon
Papers over the government's claim that disclosure of this secret
account of the Vietnam War would harm national security. The
44. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 932 (1982) (holding
membership in NAACP insufficient basis for tort liability absent proof of specific intent);
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186-87 (1972) (finding association with Students for
Democratic Socialism insufficient basis for denying use of campus meeting rooms); United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262 (1967) (holding government could not deny Communist
Party members security clearances for work in defense facilities absent proof that they had
specific intent to further the Party's unlawful ends); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 606 (1967) ("[miere knowing membership without a specific intent to further the unlaw-
ful aims of an organization is not a constitutionally adequate basis" for barring employment
in state university system to Communist Party members); Apatheker v. Sec'y of State, 378
U.S. 500, 514 (1964) (finding Communist Party membership insufficient basis for denying
passport).
45. This claim is subject to an important qualification. While the war on terrorism has
not thus far led to the direct criminalization of membership per se in political groups, the
government has resurrected the tactic of "guilt by association" in the name of cutting off ter-
rorist financing. Under a 1996 antiterrorism statute, it is a crime to provide "material sup-
port" to designated "terrorist organizations," without regard to the intent, purpose, or effect
of one's support. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 § 303(a), 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B (2003). Under this statute, it is no defense to show that one's support was in fact
intended to support only nonviolent humanitarian activities, nor even to show that one's
support was designed to and did in fact reduce a recipient group's reliance on violence. One
court of appeals has held that this statute does not violate the prohibition on guilt by associa-
tion because it punishes not membership per se, but acts of material support. Humanitarian
Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). In my view, this exalts form over sub-
stance. What good is the right of association if one has no right to provide any kind of sup-
port to the group with which one associates? See generally David Cole, Hanging with the
Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Association, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203.
At the same time, the existence of Supreme Court precedents strongly condemning guilt by
association preclude punishing membership itself and provide strong arguments against this
new version of associational guilt.
46. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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following year, in United States v. United States District Court,47 the
Court held that the Attorney General lacked power under the
Constitution to authorize warrantless "domestic security" wiretaps.
Both cases reflected a skepticism about claims of national security and
executive prerogative, and created significant constraints on the gov-
ernment's ability to enforce secrecy and to conduct searches and
wiretaps without probable cause of criminal activity.
The Court's decision in Korematsu provides the most conspicuous
counterexample to this more optimistic take on the Court's role in
reviewing national-security measures. By the time that case was
decided, according to Clinton Rossiter, "the military areas had been
disestablished and the relocation centers were being broken up.""a Yet
the Court upheld the internment by a vote of six to three and has
never reversed the decision. Pessimists might well point to Korematsu
as an example of a judicial decision having the opposite effect from
that which I have been emphasizing - as Justice Jackson warned at
the time, Korematsu might well have paved the way for future inroads
on civil rights and liberties in times of crisis.49 But Korematsu's legacy
suggests that Jackson's concern may have been overstated. While the
decision has not been formally overruled, eight of the Supreme
Court's sitting Justices have said that the case was wrongly decided. 0
Justice Scalia, perhaps the Court's most conservative member, has
compared the decision to Dred Scott.1 In short, Korematsu has not
proved to be the "loaded weapon" that Justice Jackson feared. To the
contrary, it has served as an object lesson in what the Court and the
government ought not do in future crises.
Thus, when one takes a longer view of the role of courts in con-
straining emergency powers, the picture is less bleak than the conven-
tional account admits. While most of the developments discussed
above came too late to forestall civil rights and civil liberties violations
when they were initially undertaken, they have the prophylactic effect
of forestalling the same or similar measures in future emergencies.
The judicial process is especially conducive to playing this role for
several reasons. First, since emergency powers, and the disputes to
which they give rise, tend to outlast the actual emergency, those
powers can be reviewed by courts when the worst of the crisis is over.
47. 407 U.S. 232 (1972).
48. CLINTON ROSSITER & RICHARD P. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF (1976).
49. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that the principle underlying the Korematsu decision "lies about like a loaded weapon
ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need").
50. See COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 12, at 99, 261 n.42 (citing cases).
51. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Thus, the Court's liberty-protective decisions in Milligan and Kaha-
namoku came when the wars were effectively over, and the Court's
protective decisions from the Cold War period began after McCarthy
had been censured and the height of anticommunist fervor had passed.
The ability (and obligation) of courts to assess the legality of measures
long after they have been adopted means that courts may bring more
perspective to the question than those acting in the midst of the emer-
gency.
Second, the fact that legal decisions must offer a statement of rea-
sons that then binds future cases contributes to the judiciary's ability
to exert control over the next emergency. The obligation to create and
to follow precedent means that judicial decisions are likely to have a
longer "shelf life" than those of other branches of government. The
lawyers' ability to distinguish the current emergency from prior ones,
and the current emergency measure from those previously invalidated,
means that the obligation to state reasons is no guarantee of future
effectiveness in protecting rights, but precedents do tend to take cer-
tain options off the table. The government could not punish antiwar
speech today, for example.
Third, the common-law method facilitates a measured develop-
ment of rules in the context of specific cases and permits the incorpo-
ration of lessons learned from the early and often most overreactive
stages of emergencies. Once those lessons are learned and instantiated
in Supreme Court decisions, they play an important role in precluding
certain measures that were part of the government's arsenal in the
prior emergency. In this sense, just as in Marbury, the Court's emer-
gency-powers decisions may not help the parties immediately before it
at the height of the controversy, but in the long run these decisions es-
tablish principles that are critical to checking future government
abuse.
Fourth, the formalities of the judicial process mandate the creation
of an official record that may facilitate reaching a just result. The
conviction in Korematsu was ultimately overturned on a writ of coram
nobis because Korematsu was able to show, through access to gov-
ernment records, that the Justice Department had misled the courts
about the strength of the evidence underlying its national-security
concerns. As the warrant requirement demonstrates, record-keeping
requirements permit evaluation of government actions after the fact.
While judicial proceedings are not necessary to impose record-keeping
requirements, the highly formalized judicial process itself creates a
record that may make subsequent assessments, beyond the heat of the
moment, more reliable.
Fifth, and perhaps most important, federal courts are independent
of the political process, and their institutional self-definition turns in
significant part on that independence, especially when it comes to the
interpretation and enforcement of constitutional rights. As a result,
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they are better suited to entertain claims challenging executive action
than are Congress or the executive branch itself, and more likely to
take politically unpopular positions than the political branches. While,
as noted above, judges, like other government officials, are likely to
defer to the executive branch on matters of national security, complete
deference is likely to clash with their understanding of their role as
judges.
To be sure, judicial decisions are not the only forces that may
constrain government actors in the next emergency. Developing
cultural norms may also play a role. As noted above, Korematsu has
never been formally overruled, but it is nonetheless highly unlikely
that anything on the scale of the Japanese internment would happen
again. The cultural condemnation of that initiative, reflected in
Congress's issuance of a formal apology and restitution,52 has been so
powerful that the option is a nonstarter even without controlling
Supreme Court law. But even here, the legislative apology followed
judicial decisions nullifying the convictions on writs of coram nobis"
In addition, the formal requirements that judges give reasons that are
binding on future judges means that judicial decisions are likely to
play a more specific constraining function than the development of
cultural norms. Indeed, John Finn has argued that the obligation to
give reasons is constitutive of constitutionalism and underscores the
necessity of judicial review to any meaningful system of constitutional
law. 4 Cultural norms and political initiatives are rarely as clear-cut as
a legal prohibition, and their very contestability means that they are
likely to exert less restraining force than a judicial holding. Court deci-
sions are, of course, also contestable, but generally along a narrower
range of alternatives.
Thus, the conventional wisdom that courts perform poorly in crises
should be qualified by the important proviso that, when viewed over
time, judicial decisions do exert a constraining effect on what the gov-
ernment may do in the next emergency.
III. SEPTEMBER 11TH AND THE COURTS
How have the courts fared since September 11th? As Judge
Greenberg's comments at the oral argument in North Jersey Media
Group illustrate,55 the attacks of that day and the threat of future
52. See Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903.
53. See supra note 26.
54. JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF
LAW 33 (1991) ("Some type of constitutional review is a constitutive element of constitu-
tionalism, for the activity of review, the very possibility of review, is predicated upon the ne-
cessity to produce reasons in support of action taken.").
55. See Arguments Made on Deportation Hearing Regs, supra note 30.
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catastrophes place tremendous pressure on judges. Nonetheless, a
surprising number of judicial decisions initially upheld claims of con-
stitutional rights against official antiterrorist measures. As time went
on, the picture began to look more familiar, as courts increasingly
deferred to government claims of national security. As of this writing,
the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in, and therefore all judgments
are necessarily preliminary.
Nonetheless, given the history of judicial deference in times of
crisis, the early decisions were quite stunning. In Center for National
Security Studies v. United States Department of Justice,56 a federal dis-
trict court ruled that the Justice Department's secret arrests of hun-
dreds of persons detained in a preventive detention campaign after
September 11th violated the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"),
and ordered the government to disclose the detainees' names.
In several cases challenging the government's related practice of
closing to the public all immigration proceedings involving detainees
connected to the September 11th investigations, two district courts
ruled that this practice violated the First Amendment right of access of
the public, 7 and one court ruled that it also violated a detainee's Fifth
Amendment due process right to a public hearing. 8 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit unanimously affirmed one of
the First Amendment rulings, writing that "democracies die behind
closed doors."59
A federal district judge in New York reviewing the government's
treatment of a September 11th suspect, Osama Awadallah, issued a
pair of rulings lambasting the government's tactics.6 The judge ruled
that the government had abused the "material witness" statute61 by
employing it to hold a witness for a grand jury proceeding rather than
for a criminal trial, had lied to obtain the material witness warrant,
and had physically abused Awadallah while in custody. The court
dismissed all charges against Awadallah, and ordered his release.
A district court ruled in October 2001 that a federal statute making
it a crime to provide "personnel" and "training" to designated "for-
eign terrorist organizations "62 was unconstitutionally vague, reasoning
56. 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002), modified, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
57. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, t95 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.D. Mich. 2002), affd, 303 F.3d
681 (6th Cir. 2002); N. Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.J. 2002),
rev'd, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
58. Haddad v. Ashcroft, 221 F. Supp. 2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
59. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
60. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 349 F.3d 42
(2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 82 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd, 349
F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2000).
62. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000).
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that these terms appear to prohibit clearly protected First Amendment
activity on behalf of disfavored organizations.63 In December 2003, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed that
decision and also ruled, by a two to one vote, that in order to satisfy
due process, a mens rea requirement must be read into the material
support statute.64 In January 2004, a district court in a related case
declared unconstitutional a USA PATRIOT Act provision criminal-
izing the provision of "expert advice and assistance" to terrorist
groups. 6' These provisions have proved to be the linchpin of the
government's domestic war on terrorism. 66 In. August 2003, another
federal judge declared unconstitutional the ban on providing "person-
nel" and "communications" to terrorist organizations, in one of the
Justice Department's most highly publicized post-September 11th
antiterrorist prosecutions, against the lawyer and translators for
Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman.67
In May 2002, the federal judges authorized to issue warrants for
searches and electronic wiretaps under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act ("FISA"), 68 sitting as one court, ruled that the mini-
mization provisions of that statute barred criminal prosecutors from
directing foreign intelligence investigations and applications for
warrants. 69 The court cited numerous problems it had experienced
under the statute, including the fact that the government had on
seventy-five prior occasions provided the court with misleading or
inaccurate information."
The district courts hearing challenges to the detentions of
American citizens Yaser Hamdi and Jose Padilla, who were being held
as "enemy combatants," also rejected sweeping assertions that the de-
tainees had no right to see a lawyer or to obtain judicial review of their
detentions. In Hamdi, District Judge Robert G. Doumar rejected the
government's position that habeas corpus review was unavailable,
insisted that judicial review was required, and sharply dismissed the
63. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, No. CV 98-1971 ABC (BQRx), 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16729 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2001), modified sub nom. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S.
Dep't of Justice, No. 02-55082, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 24305 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003).
64. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 02-55082, 2003 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24305 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2003).
65. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, No. CV-03-6107, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 926
(U.S. Jan. 22, 2004).
66. See COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 12, at 75-76, 256 n.ll.
67. United States v. Sattar, No. 02 Cr. 395 (JGK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12531
(S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2003).
68. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1863 (2000).
69. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611 (U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. 2002).
70. Id. at 620.
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government's submission of a two-page declaration from a
government bureaucrat based on unidentified hearsay as insufficient
to establish the propriety of detaining Hamdi.7" In an early appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the most
conservative federal appellate court in the nation, similarly rejected
the government's "sweeping contention" that the President could,
without judicial review, designate citizens as enemy combatants and
hold them indefinitely. 2
The district court hearing a habeas action on behalf of Padilla
similarly ruled that it could review the legality of the detention. And
over strong objections from the military, the court also ordered that
Padilla, who has been held incommunicado, must be granted access to
his attorney for purposes of challenging his detention.73 On appeal, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit went even further, ruling
that the President lacked any authority to hold citizens as enemy com-
batants absent express authorization from Congress.74
In December 2003, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit ruled that the foreign nationals held as enemy combat-
ants in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, have a right to seek habeas corpus
review in federal court of the legality of their detentions.75
Several other lower courts had previously held to the contrary, but in
November 2003, the Supreme Court granted review of two such lower
court decisions over the opposition of the executive branch.76 In
January 2004, the Court also agreed to hear Yaser Hamdi's claims that
he was being held unlawfully as an enemy combatant, again over the
opposition of the executive branch, which had urged the Court to deny
certiorari.77 Thus, in an area where the administration initially asserted
unilateral authority to detain, unreviewable by the courts, the
Supreme Court has now agreed to exercise review. What that review
will consist of remains to be seen, of course. But the very fact that the
Court agreed to hear the cases over the executive branch's opposition
is significant.
71. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, 316 F.3d 450 (4th
Cir. 2002).
72. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).
73. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Padilla v. Rumsfeld,
243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (reaffirming earlier decision and denying motion for re-
consideration).
74. Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
75. Gherebi v. Bush, No. 03-55785, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25625 (9th Cir. Dec. 18,
2003).
76. Al Odah v. United States, No. 03-343, 124 S. Ct. 534, 2003 WL 22070725 (U.S. Nov.
10, 2003) (granting certiorari).
77. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-6696, 124 S. Ct. 981, 2004 WL 42546 (U.S. Jan. 9, 2004)
(granting certiorari).
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In two of the most prominent prosecutions in the war on terrorism,
those charging French citizen Zacarias Moussaoui with involvement in
the September 11th conspiracy and American citizen John Walker
Lindh with aiding Al Qaeda and conspiring to kill Americans, federal
courts ruled, again over strenuous objections from the government,
that the defendants must be granted access to enemy combatant
detainees who allegedly had exculpatory evidence about the defen-
dants.7" Shortly after the district court in the Lindh case issued that
ruling, the government agreed to drop all terrorism charges in
exchange for a plea of guilty to a lesser charge.79 In the Moussaoui
case, the government has appealed the district court's ruling and has
suggested that if it does not prevail, it may remove Moussaoui's case
from the criminal process to a military tribunal."0
Four federal judges have declared unconstitutional a regulation
issued shortly after September 11th that gives immigration "prosecu-
tors," or district directors, the power to keep a foreign national in
custody when the immigration judge presiding over the case has found
no basis for detention and ordered release on bond.81 All four courts
found that the regulation violated due process by permitting preven-
tive detention where no showing of flight risk or danger to the
community had been made.
These decisions suggest an increasing willingness on the part of
judges to question broad assertions of national security. At the same
time, other decisions, including subsequent decisions in several of the
same cases, fit the more traditional model of deference. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the blanket closure of immigra-
tion hearings," and the Supreme Court denied a petition for certio-
rari. 3 A specially convened court of appeals, after entertaining a
one-sided secret appeal by the government, reversed the unanimous
decision of the FISA judges imposing limits on criminal prosecutors'
role in FISA investigations and also ruled that the USA PATRIOT
78. See United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2003); Katherine Q. Seelye,
War on Terror Makes for Odd Twists in Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2002, at A16.
79. United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002); Jane Mayer, Lost in the
Jihad: Why Did the Government's Case Against John Walker Lindh Collapse?, NEW
YORKER, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50.
80. Toni Locy, Moussaoui Clash Tests Future of Terror Trials, USA TODAY, July 21,
2003, at 2A; Susan Schmidt, Prosecution of Moussaoui Nears a Crossroad: Facing Demands
for Witness Testimony, Government May Turn Suspect Over to U.S. Military, WASH. POST,
Jan. 21, 2003, at A8.
81. Ashley v. Ridge, 288 F. Supp. 2d 662 (D.N.J. 2003); Uritsky v. Ridge, 286 F. Supp. 2d
842 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Bezmen v. Ashcroft, 245 F. Supp. 2d 446 (D. Conn. 2003); Almonte-
Vargas v. Elwood, No. 02-CV-2666, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12387 (E.D. Pa. June 28, 2002).
82. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
83. 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).
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Act's expansion of FISA posed no Fourth Amendment problems.84
Again, the Supreme Court denied review."
The Fourth Circuit in a later appeal in the Hamdi case essentially
gave the government what the court earlier said it would not counte-
nance - the power to detain without any meaningful judicial review.
The Fourth Circuit upheld Hamdi's detention on the basis of nothing
more than what it characterized as the "undisputed" fact that Hamdi
had been captured on the battlefield abroad and refused to allow
Hamdi to participate in the review.86 (The court did not explain how
the circumstances of Hamdi's capture could be disputed or undisputed
when Hamdi was unable to participate in the proceeding, and the
lawyers representing his interests had no basis for knowing where he
was captured).
And with the exception of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Gherebi,
federal courts have refused even to consider habeas corpus petitions
challenging the detention of foreign enemy combatants at Guan-
tanamo Bay, although the Supreme Court has agreed to review the
threshold jurisdictional question on whether the courts have any
power to entertain the habeas claims.87
After the Awadallah decision, another judge in the same federal
district ruled that the material witness statute was properly employed
to detain witnesses to testify in grand jury proceedings and was not
limited to criminal cases.89 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit subsequently reversed the lower court decision in Awadallah
and reinstated the perjury charges against Awadallah."
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed the FOIA
decision requiring disclosure of the names of the September 11th
detainees, over a spirited dissent by Judge David Tatel.91 Finally, the
federal courts have uniformly dismissed constitutional concerns raised
by two Muslim charities whose assets have been frozen on vague
84. In re Sealed Case No. 02-001, 310 F.3d 717 (U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Ct. of Review 2002).
85. ACLU v. United States, 538 U.S. 920 (2003).
86. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004).
87. See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124
S. Ct. 534 (2003); Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123
S. Ct. 2073 (2003).
88. United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 17 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd 349 F.3d 42
(2d Cir. 2003).
89. In re the Application of the United States for a Material Witness Warrant, 213 F.
Supp. 2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
90. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 2003).
91. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004).
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charges of support for terrorism under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act.9z
It is too early to draw firm conclusions regarding the role of courts
in the war on terrorism; we are, after all, still in the initial stages of this
crisis, when courts are historically deferential, and the Supreme Court
has not yet weighed in. The lower courts' greater willingness to chal-
lenge the government's national-security assertions may reflect the
fact that the buck does not stop with those courts; any ruling against
the government in this area is likely to be but one stop along the road
to appeal. The Supreme Court was able to reach the result it did
in Marbury in part because it left the President with nothing to defy,
and thereby created the space to, announce its doctrine of judicial
supremacy. So, too, a district court decision on a matter of national se-
curity is unlikely to be the judiciary's last word, and therefore it may
be easier for a district court to rule against the government's national-
security assertions. The further up the appellate chain, the more likely
a judicial decision will be determinative, and consequently, the more
pressure judges may feel to uphold the government's actions.
Cultural factors may also play a role in the marginally increased
willingness of courts to question the government's national-security
initiatives. As Jack Goldsmith and Cass Sunstein have argued,
President Bush's order authorizing military tribunals sparked a much
more critical public reaction than did President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's use of military tribunals during World War II." They
attribute the change to an increasing distrust of government in the
wake of Vietnam and Watergate, and to a "massively strengthened
commitment to individual rights" in our constitutional law.94
Without a doubt, the Vietnam era, and especially the revelations of
FBI abuses targeted at antiwar and civil rights protesters during that
period, effected a seismic shift in public and judicial attitudes toward
executive power and national-security claims.95 Before Vietnam, J.
Edgar Hoover was a national hero; today his name is shorthand for
politically motivated government repression. The abuses of
COINTELPRO, including extensive wiretapping of Dr. Martin Luther
92. See Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D.D.C.
2002), aff d, 333 F.3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Global Relief Found., Inc. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp.
2d 779 (N.D. Il. 2002), affd, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Global
Relief Found., Inc. v. Snow, 124 S. Ct. 531 (2003).
93. Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a
Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. CoMM. 261 (2003).
94. Id. at 282.
95. See generally SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK III, FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT
COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, S. REP. No. 94-755 (1976); FRANK DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE:
THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA'S POLITICAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM (1980).
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King, Jr., infiltration and disruption of lawful political organizations
through "dirty tricks," secret warrantless searches, and the compiling
of extensive records on the Bureau's critics, all undertaken under the
rubric of "national security," have given the public and the media
good reason to be skeptical about assertions of unchecked executive
power.
Significantly, the Supreme Court itself took part in that transfor-
mation, as it permitted the publication of the Pentagon Papers,96 held
unconstitutional warrantless "domestic security" wiretaps,97 and
rejected President Nixon's broad assertions of executive privilege in
connection with the Watergate prosecutions.98 In each of these cases,
the Court stood up to the government, and its public reputation was
enhanced as a result. That experience may well play a role in the
courts' apparently greater willingness to challenge the government in
the current era.99
A third factor may be the dramatically increased presence of
human rights, civil rights, civil liberties, and immigrants' rights groups.'
During the Cold War, for example, the American Civil Liberties
Union, the organization one might expect to be defending the
Communists, was busy purging itself of Communists."° The National
Lawyers Guild was one of the few legal organizations to defend
Communists' rights, and the Attorney General and the Director of the
FBI targeted it as a Communist front organization for its efforts."°
Today, by contrast, the ACLU has been a vigorous defender of
civil liberties, and it stands among a broad spectrum of organizations
and institutions that have spoken out for the need to respect civil
liberties in the war on terrorism. These include human rights organiza-
tions such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and
the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights; civil liberties and civil
rights groups such as the Center for Constitutional Rights, the
National Lawyers Guild, the National Committee to Protect Political
Freedom, and the Center for National Security Studies; immigrants'
rights and ethnicity-based groups such as the American-Arab
96. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
97. United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 232 (1972).
98. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
99. Coincidentally, the district court judge who initially barred the use of "domestic se-
curity" wiretaps, Judge Damon Keith, also wrote the decision for the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit declaring unconstitutional John Ashcroft's blanket closure of immigration
hearings.
100. See SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE
ACLU 173-216 (1990).
101. Id. at 177, 264-65; see also ROBERT JUSTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN
MODERN AMERICA: FROM 1870 TO THE PRESENT 364 (1978); ATHAN G. THEOHARIS &
JOHN STUART Cox, THE BULL: J. EDGAR HOOVER AND THE GREAT AMERICAN
INQUISITION 218-19 (1988).
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Anti-Discrimination Committee, the American Immigration Lawyers'
Association, the Asian American Legal Defense Fund, the National
Immigration Forum, and the Japanese American Citizens League;
grassroots organizing groups such as the Bill of Rights Defense
Committees; religious groups such as the Muslim Public Affairs
Council and the Council on American Islamic Relations; electronic
privacy-focused groups such as the Center for Democracy and
Technology and the Electronic Privacy Information Center; and liber-
tarian organizations such as the Cato Institute. Most of these groups
did not even exist during the Cold War. Their active and vocal pres-
ence today creates opportunities for grassroots involvement and
education; generates reports and press releases on civil liberties
abuses; gives voice to those who would otherwise be voiceless; and
brings both domestic and international media attention to the
government's excesses."02 That in turn affects the broader culture of
concern about rights, which may lead courts to be more attentive than
they might otherwise be to concerns on the liberty side of the security-
liberty balance.
In short, while courts remain no panacea, we ought not dismiss
them too quickly, as they have the potential to play a critical role in
checking emergency powers.
IV. AN UNTIMELY PROPOSAL
Despite these developments, some commentators have recently
argued that the Constitution and, by extension, the courts ought not
play much of a role at all in restricting the government's emergency
powers. Professors Oren Gross and Mark Tushnet have each proposed
that in light of the failure of constitutional constraints to limit execu-
tive action during emergencies, it might be better to recognize explic-
itly the validity of extraconstitutional measures during emergencies, or
put differently, to acknowledge that emergency powers are not gov-
erned by the Constitution." 3 Both do so in large part to avoid tainting
102. One initiative in particular has appeared to be especially influential. Soon after the
USA PATRIOT Act was enacted, the Bill of Rights Defense Committee formed to pursue a
grassroots strategy of getting local towns and counties to adopt resolutions condemning the
civil liberties abuses of the Patriot Act. As of February 2004, 242 jurisdictions had adopted
such resolutions, including three states - Hawaii, Alaska, and Vermont - and several
major cities, including Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Baltimore, San Francisco, and
Albuquerque. See Bill of Rights Def. Comm., http://www.bordc.org (last updated Feb. 6,
2004). The initiative appears to have shifted public views toward the Patriot Act, prompting
the Attorney General to launch an unprecedented speaking tour to seek to defend the Act.
See David Cole, On the Road with Ashcroft, NATION, Sept. 22, 2003, at 22.
103. Gross, supra note 14; Tushnet, supra note 14. Professor George Alexander before
them made a similar argument, contending that because courts perform poorly in emergen-
cies, they should not get involved at all, and "redress must be achieved politically if it is to be
effective." George J. Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National
Courts During Periods of Emergency, 5 HuM. RTS. L.J. 1, 27,65 (1984).
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constitutional law for ordinary times with decisions rendered on the
exercise of emergency authorities. Justice Jackson warned of precisely
such danger in his dissent in Korematsu. He maintained that as
threatening to liberty as the military order establishing Japanese
internment was, "a judicial construction of the due process clause that
will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the
promulgation of the order itself."' '° He reasoned that the military
order would last only so long as the emergency and could be lifted by
a subsequent commander, but that
once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it con-
forms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show
that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has
validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and
of transplanting American citizens. 105
Justice Jackson's proposal was in fact far more modest than his
critique. He argued that the civil courts ought not play a role in
enforcing military orders.'06 Korematsu's case arose from a criminal
prosecution in civil court for violating the military's exclusion order,
and Justice Jackson would have reversed the conviction on the ground
that civilian courts ought not dirty their hands with the military's busi-
ness. But Jackson's proposal is as ineffectual as it is modest. It would
have resolved Korematsu's case, but it would not have removed civil-
ian courts from the business of reviewing the legality of military deten-
tion. Other detainees might well have filed habeas corpus actions
challenging the validity of their detention. Unless Justice Jackson was
prepared to say that the courts could unilaterally suspend the writ of
habeas corpus for any military detention, he could not have avoided
the necessity of passing judgment on the military's actions.
Mark Tushnet, in a thoughtful article provocatively titled
Defending Korematsu?, 7 cites Jackson's observations but takes them
one step further. Not content with Jackson's prescription, Tushnet
argues much more broadly for affirmative recognition of extraconsti-
tutional emergency powers: "it is better to have emergency powers
exercised in an extraconstitutional way, so that everyone understands
that the actions are extraordinary, than to have the actions rational-
ized away as consistent with the Constitution and thereby normal-
ized."10 8 In his view, this is justified in order "to avoid normalizing the
exception."1"
104. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245-46 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 247 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
107. Tushnet, supra note 14.
108. Id. at 306.
109. Id. at 307.
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Oren Gross advocates a similar approach in much more detail in
Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?10 Gross contends, like Tushnet, that as a matter of
reality we should candidly acknowledge that executive officials in
times of crisis will act extraconstitutionally, and that we should do so
in order to avoid "contaminat[ing]" the ordinary legal system with
emergency powers."' 1 Gross would "inform public officials that they
may act extralegally when they believe that such action is necessary
for protecting the nation and the public in the face of calamity pro-
vided that they openly and publicly acknowledge the nature of their
actions.'. 2 Because on this view extralegal authority is expressly per-
mitted, the courts would not play a role in restraining such authority.
Instead, it would "be up to the people to decide, either directly or
indirectly (e.g., through their elected representatives in the legisla-
ture), how to respond to such actions."" 3 Like Tushnet, Gross insists
that his approach is aimed at "the preservation of the constitutional
order and of its most fundamental principles and tenets."'1 4 He argues
that the requirement that officials seeking to exercise such powers
must act openly in defiance of the law and throw themselves on the
judgment of the people would serve as an important deterrent to
executive abuse of emergency powers.
These proposals are misguided. While I share to some extent the
authors' skepticism about the ability of courts to protect the individual
rights of those before them in national-security emergencies, both
authors ignore the long-term benefits that judicial decisions in the
national-security area have had in narrowing the range of rights-
violative options available to the government in the next emergency.
Were courts to adopt the Gross-Tushnet notion that extraconstitu-
tional measures are appropriate during emergencies, and that the only
real check is political, much would be lost and little gained in the pro-
tection of civil liberties.
I would hesitate to adopt the Gross-Tushnet position for several
reasons. First, it is predicated on a distinction between "emergency"
periods and "normal" periods that, as Gross himself has convincingly
shown, simply cannot be maintained. As Gross argues, "the belief in
our ability to separate emergency from normalcy, counter-terrorism
measures from the ordinary set of legal rules and norms," is a danger-
ous illusion."5 The United States has been under one state of emer-
110. Gross, supra note 14.
111. Id. at 1133.
112. Id. at 1023.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1024.
115. Gross, supra note 14, at 1022, 1069-96.
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gency or another since 1933; by the mid-1970s, there were more than
470 "emergency" laws on the books."6 Israel has been under an emer-
gency regime since it was established as a state more than fifty years
ago. " ' And Great Britain has been under a state of emergency for
most of the last thirty years, occasioned first by the IRA and later by
the attacks of September 11th."8 Thus, emergency powers have a way
of surviving long after the emergency has passed, and emergencies
themselves may last decades. Emergency measures adopted in the
United States today are especially likely to be long-lasting, given the
nature of the war on terrorism, which is more like the war on drugs
than a traditional war between nations. 9 When Donald Rumsfeld was
asked when the war on terrorism would be over (and therefore when
the Guantanamo enemy combatant detainees would be freed), he
answered that the war would not be over until there were no longer
any "effective global terrorist networks functioning in the world."'2°
Vice President Richard Cheney has been even more candid, arguing
that we should consider the current period not an emergency at all,
but "the new normalcy.' 12'
If the line between emergency and normal is evanescent, a doctrine
of extraconstitutional authority cannot be safely cabined to emergency
times. Far from protecting the Constitution in normal times, then, a
doctrine expressly authorizing extralegal actions during emergencies
would be at least as likely to contaminate the norm by expanding the
realm of available government measures across the board as would
insistence on a continuing role for courts and the Constitution in
checking emergency and nonemergency government action.
Second, the Gross-Tushnet proposal to acknowledge extraconstitu-
tional power would be likely to undermine the protection of rights
116. Glenn E. Fuller, Note, The National Emergency Dilemma: Balancing the
Executive's Crisis Powers with the Need for Accountability, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1453
(1979). When the Senate considered a balanced budget amendment in 1995, Senator Howell
Heflin proposed a "national security" exception and implied that it would have been appro-
priately invoked some 200 times in the 220 years of the republic. See Theodore P. Seto,
Drafting a Federal Balanced Budget Amendment That Does What It Is Supposed to Do (and
No More), 106 YALE L.J. 1449,1533 (1997).
117. Gross, supra note 14, at 1073.
118. Id. at 1074.
119. Tushnet concedes that the war on terrorism is more like a "condition" than an
"emergency," but he does not explain how or even whether judges in his model would dis-
tinguish between the two. See Tushnet, supra note 14, at 297.
120. News Transcript, Dep't of Defense News Briefing: Secretary Rumsfeld and General
Myers (Mar. 28, 2002), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/ transcripts/2002/ t03282002
_t0328sd.html.
121. Lynn Ludlow, Paper Tigers, S.F. CHRONICLE, Nov. 4, 2001, at C2; Bob Woodward,
CIA Told To Do "Whatever Necessary" to Kill Bin Laden; Agency and Military Collobarat-
ing at "Unprecedented" Level; Cheney Says War Against Terror "May Never End," WASH.
POST, Oct. 21,2001, at Al.
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during emergencies (and by extension, during normal times that offi-
cials call emergencies). Gross claims that his proposal would have a
salutary deterrent effect on official abuse of emergency powers,
because officials could never be certain that their actions would in fact
be ratified after the fact. And he argues that shifting the locus of justi-
fication and judgment from the judiciary to a political forum - the
people or their elected representatives - would avoid the problem
identified by Justice Jackson of formally authorizing emergency meas-
ures through judicial approval.
There are substantial reasons, however, to doubt both of Gross's
claims. Even if acknowledging the legitimacy of extralegal measures
would avoid formal judicial approval, it would not avoid the creation
of less formal precedents that could be pointed to later to justify fur-
ther incursions on liberties. The post hoc political rationalization pro-
cess that Gross envisions, while lacking the attributes of the formal le-
gal process, would nonetheless generate a more informal common law
of extralegal emergency authorities. Once the political process has
ratified a particular extralegal emergency action, officials will be able
to point to that precedent as justification for their own subsequent
actions. "Illegal" measures deemed permissible after the fact will no
longer be clearly illegal, so long as a subsequent emergency can be
analogized to the emergency found to warrant the illegal action previ-
ously. '2
Nor is it clear that the Gross-Tushnet proposal would have the
effect of avoiding formal judicial approval of emergency measures.
Even if we were to adopt such a scheme, public officials would be
exceedingly unlikely to admit that their actions were extralegal.
Rather, they would almost invariably argue first that their measures
were constitutional and argue only in the alternative that their actions
were justified even if illegal."2 3 As a result, courts would continue to
have to address the legality of emergency measures, and the drive to
accommodate the Constitution to emergency conditions would con-
tinue to exert pressure on constitutional jurisprudence. Given the
open-ended character of the Constitution and the fact that few of the
liberties it protects are absolute, there will rarely be an emergency
measure that government lawyers cannot defend with some constitu-
122. The 1988 statute offering restitution and an apology to the victims of the Japanese
internment program suggests that at some point the political process may repudiate prior
emergency measures. But that is almost certainly the exception that proves the rule. It took
forty years to achieve and came only after the federal courts had themselves repudiated the
convictions arising from the exclusion and internment programs. See supra note 26. Had the
political process been asked to ratify the internment at the time, or in the decade or so that
followed it, there is no evidence to suggest the result would have been repudiation rather
than ratification.
123. See FINN, supra note 54, at 9 (1991) ("Even public officials who propose action that
is arguably extraconstitutional typically seek to justify their actions on constitutional
grounds.").
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tional argument. And while an open acknowledgment of the propriety
of extralegal measures might reduce the hydraulic forces inducing
courts to uphold emergency actions, the extent to which this would
''save" normal constitutional law or deter abuse of emergency powers
seems likely to be minimal. For the reasons stated above, courts would
presumably still be reticent to rule against the government in emer-
gency periods. And the open acknowledgment of the validity of extra-
constitutional authority would seriously undercut the force of judicial
decisions that now constrain emergency measures.
From the standpoint of deterring the abuse of emergency author-,
ity, the Gross-Tushnet proposal is not very different from what
already exists. If a government official today adopts an extraconstitu-
tional response to an emergency and his actions are later declared
unconstitutional, he may in theory be subject to civil or criminal sanc-
tions. But the likelihood that criminal or civil sanctions will be
imposed is, in fact, virtually nil, and in any event the state nearly
always indemnifies its officials from such liability.124 Moreover, such an
official could always seek political post hoc ratification, in the form of
immunity or indemnity from Congress or a pardon from the President.
Thus, under the status quo, elected officials who act extraconstitution-
ally already face some, albeit limited, risk of liability, and have some
political recourse to avoid liability.
Third, there is little reason to trust the political process to do the
job of judging that Gross and Tushnet would assign to it. The real dif-
ference under a Gross-Tushnet approach would be that the principal
job of judging emergency measures would presumptively fall not on
the courts but on the political process. But this seems the most dubi-
ous aspect of the proposal. If courts are not particularly reliable in
imposing limits on executive action during emergencies, the political
process would almost certainly be worse. As Gross himself argues, the
public and their elected representatives are especially prone to over-
reaction during times of crisis. 25 The public is easily scared, and quick
to approve of security measures launched in its name, especially if the
measures do not directly affect the rights of the majority. Their elected
representatives know that, and vote accordingly. Indeed, the very rea-
son that we adopted a Constitution was that we understood that the
people and their representatives would be tempted to violate basic
principles in times of stress. In the words of Senator John Stockton in
1871: "Constitutions are chains with which men bind themselves in
124. Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public
Officials' Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65 (1999) (critiquing the breadth of
immunity doctrines and noting that indemnification of government officials is nearly univer-
sal).
125. Gross, supra note 14, at 1035-42.
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their sane moments that they may not die by a suicidal hand in the day
of their frenzy.' 1 26
Moreover, emergency measures almost always selectively target
vulnerable groups and individuals, and foreign nationals in particular,
making the political process an especially unreliable check on emer-
gency powers.127 This fact apparently does not concern Tushnet; 12s but
for those concerned with the human rights of the most vulnerable,
proposals that point to political rather than judicial processes for
assessing the validity of emergency measures are fatally flawed.
Finally, Gross and Tushnet's proposal rests on the conventional
wisdom that courts cannot be trusted to perform well in times of crisis.
But the real question to be asked when assessing the courts'
performance is: Compared to what? The courts are undoubtedly
highly imperfect; but the alternatives are worse. One cannot rely on
the executive branch to police itself in times of crisis. As Francis
Biddle, Franklin Delano Roosevelt's Attorney General, candidly
acknowledged, "The Constitution has not bothered any wartime
President.' 1 29 Executive officials after September 11th knew that they
would take a much bigger "hit" politically if there were another
terrorist act than if they locked up thousands of foreign nationals
unconnected to terrorism. In such periods, executive officials ask for
untrammeled authority, and assure the public that they will not abuse
it. History shows that such trust is not warranted.
Congress is also unlikely to be a guardian of civil liberties. Its
overwhelming approval of the Smith Act 130 and the Internal Security
Act' during the McCarthy era and of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act'32 and the Patriot Act'33 in the current era, coupled
with its appropriation of funds for the Japanese internment in World
126. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 574 (1871).
127. COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 12; David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 953 (2002); Gross, supra note 14, at 1037, 1082-85.
128. Tushnet, supra note 14, at 296-97 (arguing that the Justice Department's selective
targeting of Arab and Muslim foreign nationals for questioning, secret detentions and trials,
and selective deportation "does not seem to be a violation of civil liberties," and if so, are
only "violations of the rights of residents who are not U.S. citizens"). In my view, these ac-
tions violated a wide range of constitutional rights, and the fact that they specifically affected
foreign nationals, the most vulnerable and voiceless among us, only exacerbates the wrongs.
See generally COLE, ENEMY ALIENS, supra note 12.
129. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 219 (1962).
130. Alien Registration Act, Pub. L. No. 76-670, 54 Stat. 670 (1940).
131. Internal Security Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987.
132. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214.
133. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272.
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War II, illustrate that legislators are exceedingly unlikely to stand up
against executive power in the name of civil liberties during emergen-
cies. The need to be seen as "doing something" about the threat often
translates into legislation that delegates sweeping powers to the execu-
tive branch.
Only the courts have an obligation to entertain claims of rights
violations. The executive and legislative branches can simply choose to
ignore such claims, and are likely to do so when those claims are not
backed by substantial political power or influence. By contrast,
assuming standing and justiciability, courts must adjudicate any claim
that a government initiative violates constitutional rights. As a result,
courts are often the only forum realistically available. For more than
two years, the President has asserted the unilateral power to detain
anyone he labels as an enemy combatant. Congress has done nothing
to check or limit or even seriously address this assertion of power. The
courts, by contrast, have addressed the question and issued multiple
opinions, all of which are as of this writing headed for Supreme Court
review.
To cite another example, over the past decade and a half, I have
represented thirteen foreign nationals whom the government accused
of having ties to terrorist organizations and sought to detain or deport
using classified evidence that the foreign nationals had no opportunity
to confront or rebut.34 The government maintained that the individu-
als' presence in the United States threatened national security, and
that revealing the evidence that proved that contention would itself
endanger national security. All thirteen were eventually released
without undermining national security, but only when we challenged
the government's actions in court as a violation of due process. Of the
thirteen, twelve were Arab and/or Muslim. The thirteenth was a
Kenyan woman married to a Palestinian and accused of being associ-
ated with a Palestinian organization.
What were our options in seeking to protect these individuals' con-
stitutional rights? Congress would not help them. The issue of secret
evidence in immigration proceedings had been raised in Congress, but
far from providing a remedy, in 1996 Congress expressly expanded
and authorized its use in a number of immigration settings.'35 The ex-
ecutive branch was equally unresponsive. It was the executive branch,
after all, that invoked the tactic in the first place. Even under the ad-
ministration of President Bill Clinton, the executive branch was not a
source of relief. And the public and the press, with a few exceptions,
by and large paid little attention. When a court ordered an individual
134. See generally David Cole, Secrecy, Guilt by Association, and the Terrorist Profile, 15
J.L. & RELIGION 267 (2000-2001).
135. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act § 401 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1531
(2000)).
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released, its decision would often receive coverage in the print media.
But I received countless phone calls from television news producers
over the years looking for legal stories, all of whom ultimately deter-
mined that the secret evidence story would not sell because it involved
foreign nationals rather than citizens. 136 For my clients, it was court or
nothing, court or more years of detention based on evidence they
could not see. And to their credit, the courts were uniformly skeptical
of the government's claims, and protective of the foreign nationals'
right to see the evidence being used to deprive them of their liberty.137
Even immigration judges, who as administrative judges ultimately re-
viewable by the Attorney General lack the independence of the fed-
eral courts, were highly skeptical of the government's claims.'38
Because courts are the only realistic option available to those
targeted by emergency measures, and precisely because judges are all
too human and already face substantial pressure to avoid fulfilling
their responsibility, it seems especially misguided to advocate that they
do so. The formal guarantees and ethical obligation of independence
do not mean that judges are in fact always impartial and courageous,
but the insistence that it is their obligation to be independent is critical
to the enterprise of judging. We should not let judges off the hook
when it comes to emergency matters, because they are the only real
option for most persons targeted by emergency measures. As Fred
Schauer has eloquently argued in a different setting, "The mere fact
that courts will fold under pressure, however, does not dictate that
they should be told that they may fold under pressure, because the
effect of the message may be to increase the likelihood of folding even
when the pressure is less."' 39 Schauer continued, "Resisting the inevi-
table is not to be desired because it will prevent the inevitable, but
136. I am aware of only one exception. CBS's 60 Minutes covered the story of the gov-
ernment's use of secret evidence to deny entry to a group of Iraqis who had been involved in
a failed CIA-backed coup attempt against Saddam Hussein, had been airlifted out of Iraq by
the United States, but had then been determined at the border to have been double agents
based on classified evidence. 60 Minutes: Unfinished Business: Six Iraqis Brought to the
United States by the US Government for Help Against Saddam Hussein Are Imprisoned on
Undisclosed Charges by the INS (CBS television broadcast, July 25, 1999). But it is likely that
60 Minutes' interest in the story stemmed as much from the identity of the Iraqis' pro bono
lawyer - former CIA Director James Woolsey - as from their predicament.
137. See, e.g., American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045, 1070
(9th Cir. 1995); Rafeedie v. INS, 880 F.2d 506, 512-13, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Al Najjar v.
Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1356 (S.D. Fla. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 273 F.3d 1330
(11th Cir. 2001); Kiareldeen v. Reno, 71 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999).
138. See Cole, supra note 134, at 272-75. The immigration judges' skepticism suggests
that relief was sometimes available within the executive branch. But it is significant that the
relief came only from judges within the executive branch.
139. Frederick Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1075, 1084 n.11 (1986).
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because it may be the best strategy for preventing what is less inevita-
ble but more dangerous.' 1
4
In my view, the historical record does not demonstrate that courts
will inevitably fold under the pressure of emergencies, but only that
they will often do so. The historical developments reviewed above
suggest that at least some judges may have learned from history to
demand more narrowly tailored responses to emergencies. But more
important, the record also shows that by exercising their responsibility
to decide cases pitting individual rights against emergency executive
power, the courts have over time developed rules that do constrain the
executive in the next emergency. The danger of Gross and Tushnet's
proposal is that we would be sacrificing even that for benefits that
seem evanescent at best.
CONCLUSION
Courts, like every other institution of human governance, are
imperfect. Tasked with the job of enforcing individual constitutional
rights against the majority's will, judges remain prone to the same
fears and anxieties that afflict us all during times of crisis. Thus, it
should not be a surprise that courts have all too often deferred to
unfounded assertions of government power on issues of national secu-
rity; when the executive claims that the fate of the nation is at stake, it
takes real courage to stand up to that assertion and subject it to careful
scrutiny.
At the same time, the conventional wisdom that courts have failed
during times of crisis is itself overstated. It is based both on a snapshot
view of the courts' decisions, and on an overly idealized vision of what
is in fact possible. When considered over time, courts have played a
valuable role in reviewing and ultimately restraining some of the more
egregious rights violations undertaken in the name of saving the coun-
try. Judicial decisions, while rarely providing relief to the initial vic-
tims of a crisis mentality, have played a role in restricting the options
available to the government in the next emergency. Like Marbury v.
Madison itself, these decisions may well be more important over the
long run than their bottom lines would make them appear in the short
run.
Given the salutary role that courts have played in enforcing consti-
tutional limits on emergency responses, and given the paucity of
credible alternatives, we should be reluctant to let judges off the hook.
There seems to be little reason to trust the political branches to be
more attentive to constitutional rights concerns than courts, even if
courts themselves do not always perform as we might hope they
140. Id. at 1085.
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would. As Eugene Rostow argued in assessing the Japanese
internment cases shortly after they were decided, "It is hard to imag-
ine what courts are for if not to protect people against unconstitutional
arrest.... It is essential to every democratic value in society that offi-
cial action taken in the name of the war power be held to standards of
responsibility."141
141. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases - A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489,
511,514 (1945).
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